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The Bayesian Analysis of Complex,
High-Dimensional Models:
Can It Be CODA?
Y. Ritov, P. J. Bickel, A. C. Gamst and B. J. K. Kleijn
Abstract. We consider the Bayesian analysis of a few complex, high-
dimensional models and show that intuitive priors, which are not tai-
lored to the fine details of the model and the estimated parameters,
produce estimators which perform poorly in situations in which good,
simple frequentist estimators exist. The models we consider are: strati-
fied sampling, the partial linear model, linear and quadratic functionals
of white noise and estimation with stopping times. We present a strong
version of Doob’s consistency theorem which demonstrates that the ex-
istence of a uniformly
√
n-consistent estimator ensures that the Bayes
posterior is
√
n-consistent for values of the parameter in subsets of prior
probability 1. We also demonstrate that it is, at least, in principle, pos-
sible to construct Bayes priors giving both global and local minimax
rates, using a suitable combination of loss functions. We argue that
there is no contradiction in these apparently conflicting findings.
Key words and phrases: Foundations, CODA, Bayesian inference,
white noise models, partial linear model, stopping time, functional es-
timation, semiparametrics.
1. INTRODUCTION
We show, through a number of illustrative exam-
ples of general phenomena, some of the difficulties
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faced by application of the Bayesian paradigm in
the analysis of data from complex, high-dimensional
models. We do not argue against the use of Bayesian
methods. However, we judge the success of these
methods from the frequentist/robustness point of
view, in the tradition of Bernstein, von Mises, and
Le Cam; and more recently Cox (1993). Some refer-
ences are: Bayarri and Berger (2004), Diaconis and
Freedman (1993), Diaconis and Freedman (1998),
Freedman (1963), Freedman (1999), Le Cam and
Yang (1990) and Lehmann and Casella (1998).
The extent to which the subjective aspect of data
analysis is central to the modern Bayesian point of
view is debatable. See the dialog between Goldstein
(2006) and Berger (2006a) and the discussion of
This is an electronic reprint of the original article
published by the Institute of Mathematical Statistics in
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these two papers. However, central to any Bayesian
approach is the posterior distribution and the choice
of prior. Even those who try to reconcile Bayesian
and frequentist approaches (cf. Bayarri and Berger,
2004), in the case of conflict, tend to give greater
weight to considerations based on the posterior dis-
tribution, than to those based on frequentist assess-
ments; cf. Berger (2006b).
An older and by now less commonly held point
of view is that rational inquiry requires the choice
of a Bayes prior and exclusive use of the resulting
posterior in inference; cf. Savage (1961) and Lindley
(1953). A modern weaker version claims: “Bayes the-
orem provides a powerful, flexible tool for examining
the actual or potential ranges of uncertainty which
arise when one or more individuals seek to interpret
a given set of data in light of their own assump-
tions and ‘uncertainties about their uncertainties’,”
(Smith, 1986). This point of view, which is the philo-
sophical foundation of the Bayesian paradigm, has
consequences. Among them are the strong likelihood
principle, which says that all of the information in
the data is contained in the likelihood function, and
the stopping time principle, which says that stop-
ping rules are irrelevant to inference. We argue that
a commitment to these principles can easily lead to
absurdities which are striking in high dimensions.
We see this as an argument against ideologues.
We discuss our examples with these two types of
Bayesian analysts in mind:
I. The Bayesian who views his prior entirely as re-
flecting his beliefs and the posterior as measuring
the changes in these beliefs due to the data. Note
that this implies strict adherence to the likeli-
hood principle, a uniform plug-in principle, and
the stopping time principle. Loss functions are
not specifically considered in selecting the prior.
II. The pragmatic Bayesian who views the prior as a
way of generating decision theoretic procedures,
but is content with priors which depend on the
data, insisting only that analysis starts with a
prior and ends with a posterior.
For convenience, we refer to these Bayesians as type
I and type II.
The main difference we perceive between the type
II Bayesian and a frequentist is that when faced with
a specific problem, the type II Bayesian selects a
unique prior, uses Bayes rule to produce the poste-
rior and is then committed to using that posterior
for all further inferences. In particular, the type II
Bayesian is free to consider a particular loss function
in selecting his prior and, to the extent that this is
equivalent to using a data-dependent prior, change
the likelihood; see Wasserman (2000). That the loss
function and prior are strongly connected has been
discussed by Rubin; see Bock (2004).
We show that, in high-dimensional (non or semi-
parametric) situations Bayesian procedures based
on priors chosen by one set of criteria, for instance,
reference priors, selected so that the posterior for a
possibly infinite dimensional parameter β converges
at the minimax rate, can fail badly on other sets
of criteria, in particular, in yielding asymptotically
minimax, semiparametrically efficient, or even
√
n-
consistent estimates for specific one-dimensional pa-
rameters, θ. We show by example that priors lead-
ing to efficient estimates of one-dimensional param-
eters can be constructed but that the construction
can be subtle, and typically does not readily also
give optimal global minimax rates for infinite di-
mensional features of the model. It is true, as we
argue in Section 7, that by general considerations,
Bayes priors giving minimax rates of convergence for
the posterior distributions for both single or “small”
sets of parameters and optimal rates in global met-
rics can be constructed, in principle. Although it
was shown in Bickel and Ritov (2003) that this can
be done consistently with the “plug-in principle,”
the procedures optimal for the composite loss are
not natural or optimal, in general, for either com-
ponent. There is no general algorithm for construct-
ing such priors and we illustrate the failure of clas-
sical type II Bayesian extensions (see below) such
as the introduction of hyperparameters. Of course,
Bayesian procedures are optimal on their own terms
and we prove an extension of a theorem of Doob at
the end of this paper which makes this point. As
usual, the exceptional sets of measure zero in this
theorem can be quite large in nonparametric set-
tings.
For smooth, low-dimensional parametric mod-
els, the Bernstein–von Mises theorem ensures that
for priors with continuous positive densities, all
Bayesian procedures agree with each other and with
efficient frequentist methods, asymptotically, to or-
der n−1/2; see, for example, Le Cam and Yang
(1990). At the other extreme, even with independent
and identically distributed data, little can be said
about the extreme nonparametric model P , in which
nothing at all is assumed about the common distri-
bution of the observations, P . The natural quanti-
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ties to estimate, in this situation, are bounded lin-
ear functionals of the form θ =
∫
g(x)dP (x), with
g bounded and continuous. There are unbiased, ef-
ficient estimates of these functionals and Dirichlet
process priors, concentrating on small but dense
subsets of P yielding estimates equivalent to order
n−1/2 to the unbiased ones; see Ferguson (1973), for
instance.
The interesting phenomena occur in models be-
tween these two extremes. To be able to even spec-
ify natural unbounded linear functionals such as
the density p at a point, we need to put smooth-
ness restrictions on P and, to make rate of conver-
gence statements, global metrics such as L2 must be
used. Both Bayesians and frequentists must specify
not only the structural features of the model but
smoothness constraints. Some of our examples will
show the effect of various smoothness assumptions
on Bayesian inference.
For ease of exposition, in each of our examples,
we consider only independent and identically dis-
tributed (i.i.d.) data and our focus is on asymptotics
and estimation. Although our calculations are given
almost exclusively for specific Bayesian decision the-
oretic procedures under L2-type loss, we believe (but
do not argue in detail) that the difficulties we high-
light carry over to other inference procedures, such
as the construction of confidence regions. Here is one
implication of such a result. Suppose that we can
construct a Bayes credible region C for an infinite
dimensional parameter β which has good frequentist
and Bayesian properties, for example, asymptotic
minimax behavior for the specified model, as well as
P (β ∈ C|X) and P (β ∈ C(X)|β) > 1− α. Then we
automatically have a credible region q(C) for any
q(β). Our examples will show, however, that this
region can be absurdly large. So, while a Bayesian
might argue that parameter estimation is less im-
portant than the construction of credible regions,
our examples carry over to this problem as well.
Our examples will be discussed heuristically rather
than exhaustively, but we will make it clear when
a formal proof is needed. There is a body of theory
in the area (cf. Ghosal, Ghosh and van der Vaart,
2000, Kleijn and van der Vaart, 2006, and Bickel
and Kleijn, 2012, among others), giving specific con-
ditions under which some finite dimensional intu-
ition persists in higher dimensions. However, in this
paper we emphasize how easily these conditions are
violated and the dramatic consequences of such vi-
olations. Our examples can be thought of as points
of the parameter space to which the prior we use
assigns zero mass. Since all points of the parameter
space are similarly assigned zero mass, we have to
leave it to the readers to judge whether these points
are, in any sense, exceptional.
In Section 2, we review an example introduced
in Robins and Ritov (1997). The problem is that
of estimating a real parameter in the presence of
an infinite dimensional “nuisance” parameter. The
parameter of interest admits a very simple frequen-
tist estimator which is
√
n-consistent without any
assumptions on the nuisance parameters at all, as
long as the sampling scheme is reasonable. In this
problem, the type I Bayesian is unable to estimate
the parameter of interest at the
√
n-rate at all, with-
out making severe smoothness assumptions on the
infinite dimensional nuisance parameter. In fact, we
show that if the nuisance parameters are too rough,
a type I Bayesian is unable to find any prior giv-
ing even a consistent estimate of the parameter of
interest. On the other hand, we do construct pri-
ors, tailored to the parameter we are trying to esti-
mate, which essentially reproduce the frequentist es-
timate. Such priors may be satisfactory to a type II
Bayesian, but surely not to Bayesians of type I. The
difficulty here is that a commitment to the strong
likelihood principle forces the Bayesian analyst to
ignore information about a parameter which fac-
tors out of the likelihood and he is forced to find
some way of connecting that parameter to the pa-
rameter of interest, either through reparameteriza-
tion, which only works if the nuisance parameter is
smooth enough, or by tailoring the prior to the pa-
rameter of interest.
In Section 3, we turn to the classical partial linear
regression model. We recall results of Wang, Brown
and Cai (2011) which give simple necessary and suf-
ficient conditions on the nonparametric part of the
model for the parametric part to be estimated effi-
ciently. We use this example to show that a natural
class of Bayes priors, which yield minimax estimates
of the nonparametric part of the model under the
conditions given in Wang, Brown and Cai (2011),
lead to Bayesian estimators of the parametric part
which are inefficient. In this case, there is auxiliary
information in the form of a conditional expectation
which factors out of the likelihood but is strongly
associated with the amount of information in the
data about the parameter of interest. The frequen-
tist can estimate this effect directly, but the type I
Bayesian is forced to ignore this information and,
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depending on smoothness assumptions, may not be
able to produce a consistent estimate of the parame-
ter of interest at all. The fact that, for a sieve-based
frequentist approach, two different bandwidths are
needed for local and global estimation of parameters
in this problem has been known for some time; see
Chen and Shiau (1994).
In Section 4, we consider the Gaussian white
noise model of Ibragimov and Hasminskii (1984),
Donoho and Johnstone (1994), and Donoho and
Johnstone (1995). Here, we show that from a fre-
quentist point of view we can easily construct uni-
formly
√
n-consistent estimates of all bounded lin-
ear functionals. However, both the type I and type
II Bayesian, who are restricted to the use of one and
only one prior, must fail to estimate some bounded
linear functionals at the
√
n-rate. This is because
both are committed to the plug-in principle and, as
we argue, any plug-in estimator will fail to be uni-
formly consistent. On the positive side, we show that
it is easy to construct tailor-made Bayesian proce-
dures for any of the specific functionals we consider
in this section. Again, reparameterization, which in
this case is a change of basis, is important. The re-
sulting Bayesian procedures are capable of simul-
taneously estimating both the infinite dimensional
features of the model at the minimax rate and the
finite dimensional parameters of interest efficiently,
but linear functionals which might be of interest in
subsequent inferences, and cannot be estimated con-
sistently, remain. We give a graphic example, in this
section, to demonstrate our claims.
A second example, examined in Section 5, con-
cerns the estimation of the norm of a high-dimen-
sional vector of means, β. Again, for a suitably large
set of β, we can show that the priors normally used
for minimax estimation of the vector of means in
the L2 norm do not lead to Bayesian estimators of
the norm of β which are
√
n-consistent. Yet there
are simple frequentist estimators of this parameter
which are efficient. We then give a constructive ar-
gument showing how a type II Bayesian can bypass
the difficulties presented by this model at the cost of
selecting a nonintuitive prior and various inconsis-
tencies. A type II Bayesian can use a data-dependent
prior which allows for simultaneous estimation of
β at the minimax rate and this specific parameter
of interest efficiently. These examples show that, in
many cases, the choice of prior is subtle, even in the
type II context, and the effort involved in construct-
ing such a prior seems unnecessary, given that good,
general-purpose frequentist estimators are easy to
construct for the same parameters.
In Section 6, we give a striking example in which,
for Gaussian data with a high-dimensional parame-
ter space, we can, given any prior, construct a stop-
ping time such that the Bayesian, who must ignore
the nature of the stopping times, estimates the vec-
tor of means with substantial bias. This is a common
feature of all our examples. In high dimensions, even
for large sample sizes, the bias induced by the Bayes
prior overwhelms the data.
In Section 7, we extend Doob’s theorem, showing
that if a suitably uniform
√
n-consistent estimator
of a parameter exists, then necessarily the Bayesian
estimator of the parameter is
√
n-consistent on a
set of parameter values which has prior probability
one. We also give another elementary result showing
that it is in principle possible to construct Bayes
priors giving both global and local minimax rates,
using a suitable combination of loss functions. We
summarize our findings in Section 8.
In Appendix B, we give proofs of many of the
assertions we have made in the previous sections.
Throughout this paper, θ is a finite-dimensional pa-
rameter of interest, β is an infinite-dimensional nui-
sance parameter and g is an infinite-dimensional
parameter which is important for estimating θ ef-
ficiently, but is missing from the joint likelihood for
(θ, β); g might describe the sampling scheme, the
loss function or the specific functional θ(β) = θ(β, g)
of interest. We use π for priors and g and β are given
as g and β when it is easier to think of them as
infinite-dimensional vectors than functions.
2. STRATIFIED RANDOM SAMPLING
Robins and Ritov (1997) consider an infinite-
dimensional model of continuously stratified ran-
dom sampling in which one has i.i.d. observations
Wi = (Xi,Ri,Zi), i= 1, . . . , n; the Xi are uniformly
distributed in [0,1]d; and Zi = RiYi. The variables
Ri and Yi are conditionally independent given Xi
and take values in the set {0,1}. The function
g(X) = E(R|X) is known, with g > 0 almost every-
where, and β(X) = E(Y |X) is unknown. The param-
eter of interest is θ = E(Y ).
It is relatively easy to construct a reasonable es-
timator for θ in this problem. Indeed, the classi-
cal Horvitz–Thompson (HT) estimator (cf. Cochran,
1977),
θ̂ = n−1
n∑
i=1
Zi/g(Xi),
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solves the problem nicely. Because
E{RY/g(X)} = E{E(R|X)E(Y |X)/g(X)}
= EE(Y |X) = θ,
the estimator is consistent without any further as-
sumptions. If we assume that g is bounded from
below, the estimator is
√
n-consistent and asymp-
totically normal.
2.1 Type I Bayesian Analysis
As g is known and we have assumed that the Xi
are uniformly distributed, the only parameter which
remains is β, where β(X) = E(Y |X). Let π be a prior
density for β with respect to some measure µ. The
joint density of β and the observations W1, . . . ,Wn
is given by
p(β,W) = π(β)
∏
i:Ri=1
β(Xi)
Yi(1− β(Xi))1−Yi
·
n∏
i=1
g(Xi)
Ri(1− g(Xi))1−Ri ,
as Zi = Yi when Ri = 1. But this means that the
posterior for β has a density π(β|W) with
π(β|W)∝ π(β)
∏
i:Ri=1
β(Xi)
Yi(1− β(Xi))1−Yi .(1)
Of course, this is a function of only those observa-
tions for which Ri = 1, that is, for which the Yi are
directly observed. The observations for which Ri = 0
are deemed uninformative.
If β is assumed to range over a smooth paramet-
ric model, and the known g is bounded away from 0,
one can check that the Bernstein–von Mises theorem
applies, and that the Bayesian estimator of θ is effi-
cient,
√
n-consistent and necessarily better than the
HT estimator. Heuristically, this continues to hold
for minimax estimation of θ and β over “small” non-
parametric models for β; that is, sets of very smooth
β; see Bickel and Kleijn (2012).
In the nonparametric case, if we assume that the
prior for β does not depend on g, then, because the
likelihood function does not depend on g, the type
I Bayesian will use the same procedure whether g
is known or unknown; see (1). That is, the type I
Bayesian will behave as if g were unknown. This is
problematic because, as Robins and Ritov (1997) ar-
gued and we now show, unless β or g are sufficiently
smooth, the type I Bayesian cannot produce a con-
sistent estimator of θ. To the best of our knowledge,
the fact that there is no consistent estimator of θ
when g is unknown, unless β or g are sufficiently
smooth, has not been emphasized before.
Note that our assumption that the prior for β does
not depend on g is quite plausible. Consider, for ex-
ample, an in-depth survey of students, concerning
their scholastic interests. The design of the experi-
ment is based on all the information the university
has about the students. However, the statistician is
interested only in whether a student is firstborn or
not. At first, he gets only the list of sampled students
with their covariates. At this stage, he specifies his
prior for β. If he is now given g, there is no reason
for him to change what he believes about β, and no
reason for him to include information about g in his
prior.
The fact that, if g is unknown, θ cannot be esti-
mated unless either g or β is smooth enough, is true
even in the one-dimensional case. Our analysis is
similar to that in Robins et al. (2009). Suppose the
Xi are uniformly distributed on the unit interval,
and g is given by
g(x) =
1
2
+
1
4
m−1∑
i=0
siψ(mx− i),
wherem=mn is such thatmn/n→∞; the sequence
s1, . . . , sm ∈ {−1,1} is assumed to be exchangeable
with
∑
si = 0, and ψ(x) = 1(0≤ x < 12)−1(12 ≤ x<
1). Furthermore, assume that β(x)≡ 5/8 or β(x)≡
g(x). With probability converging to 1, there will
be no interval of length 1/m with more than one
Xi. However, given that there is one Xi ∈ (j/m, (j+
1)/m), then the distribution of (Ri,Zi) is the same
whether β(x) ≡ 5/8 or β(x) ≡ g(x), and hence θ is
not identifiable; it can be either 5/8 or 1/2. This
completes the proof.
Note that, in principle, both E(Y R|X) = β(X)g(X)
and E(R|X) = g(X) are, in general, estimable, but
not uniformly to adequate precision on “rough” sets
of (g,β). One can also reparameterize in terms of
ξ(X) = E(Y R|X) and θ. This forces g into the like-
lihood, but one still needs to assume ξ(X) is very
smooth. In the above argument, the roughness of
the model goes up with the sample size, and this is
what prevents consistent estimation.
2.2 Bayesian Procedures with Good Frequentist
Behavior
In this section, we study plausible priors for Type
II Bayesian inference. These priors are related to
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those in Wasserman (2004), Harmeling and Tous-
saint (2007) and Li (2010). We need to build knowl-
edge of g into the prior, as we argued in Section 2.1.
We do so first by following the suggestion in Harmel-
ing and Toussaint (2007) for Gaussian models.
Following Wasserman (2004), we consider now
a somewhat simplified version of the continuously
stratified random sampling model, in which the Xi
are uniformly distributed on 1, . . . ,N , with N =
Nn≫ n, such that, with probability converging to 1,
there are no ties. In this case, the unknown param-
eter β is just the N -vector, β = (β1, . . . , βN ). Our
goal is to estimate θ =N−1
∑N
i=1 βi.
To construct the prior, we proceed as follows. As-
sume that the components βi are independent, with
βi distributed according to a Beta distribution with
parameters pτ (i) and 1− pτ (i), and
pτ (i) =
eτ/gi
1 + eτ/gi
,
with τ an unknown hyperparameter. Let θ∗ =N−1 ·∑N
i=1 pτ (i). Note that under the prior θ = N
−1 ·∑N
i=1 βi = θ
∗ + OP (N
−1/2), by the CLT. We now
aim to estimate θ∗. In the language of Lindley and
Smith (1972), we shift interest from a random effect
to a fixed effect. This is level 2 analysis in the lan-
guage of Everson and Morris (2000). The difference
between θ and θ∗ is apparent in a full population
analysis; see, for example, Berry, Reese and Larkey
(1999) and Li (1999), where the real interest is in θ∗.
In this simplified model, marginally, X1, . . . ,Xn
are i.i.d. uniform on 1, . . . ,N , Yi and Ri are inde-
pendent given Xi, with Yi|Xi ∼ Binomial(1, pτ (Xi)),
and Ri|Xi ∼ Binomial(1, g(Xi)). The log-likelihood
function for τ is given by
ℓ(τ) =
∑
Ri=1
[Yi log pτ (Xi) + (1− Yi) log(1− pτ (Xi))].
This is maximized at τˆ satisfying
0 = n−1
∑
Ri=1
(
Yi
p˙τˆ (Xi)
pτˆ (Xi)
− (1− Yi) p˙τˆ (Xi)
1− pτˆ (Xi)
)
= n−1
∑
Ri=1
p˙τˆ (Xi)
pτˆ (Xi)(1− pτˆ (Xi)) (Yi − pτˆ (Xi))
= n−1
∑
Ri=1
(Yi − pτˆ (Xi))/g(Xi)
= θˆHT − 1
n
n∑
i=1
Ri
g(Xi)
pτˆ (Xi),
where p˙τ is the derivative of pτ with respect to τ .
A standard Bernstein–von Mises argument shows
that τˆ is within oP (n
−1/2) of the Bayesian estimator
of τ , thus θˆ∗B , the Bayesian estimator of θ
∗, satisfies
θˆ∗B =
1
N
N∑
i=1
pτˆ (i) + oP (n
−1/2)
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
Ri
g(Xi)
pτˆ (Xi) +OP (n
−1/2)
= θˆHT +OP (n
−1/2)
(where OP and oP are evaluated under the popula-
tion model).
The estimator presented in Li (2010) is somewhat
similar; however, his estimator is inconsistent, in
general, and consistent only if E(Y |R= 1) = EY (as,
in fact, his simulations demonstrate).
With this structure, it is unclear how to define
sets of β on which uniform convergence holds. This
construction merely yields an estimator equivalent
to the nonparametric HT estimator.
This prior produces a good estimator of θ∗ but,
for other functionals, for example, E(Y |g(X)> a) or
E(β′β), the prior leads to estimators which are not
even consistent. So, if we are stuck with the resulting
posterior, as a type II Bayesian would be, we have
solved the specific problem with which we were faced
at the cost of failing to solve other problems which
may come to interest us.
3. THE PARTIAL LINEAR MODEL
In this section, we consider the partial linear
model, also known as the partial spline model, which
was originally discussed in Engle et al. (1986); see
also Schick (1993). In this case, we have observations
Wi = (Xi,Ui, Yi) such that
Yi = θXi+ β(Ui) + εi,(2)
where the (Xi,Ui) form an i.i.d. sample from a joint
density p(x,u), relative to Lebesgue measure on the
unit square, [0,1]2; β is an element of some class of
functions B; and the εi are i.i.d. standard-normal.
The parameter of interest is θ and β is a (possibly
very nonsmooth) nuisance parameter. Let g(U) =
E(X|U). For simplicity, assume that U is known to
be uniformly distributed on the unit interval.
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3.1 The Frequentist Analysis
Up to a constant, the log-likelihood function
equals
ℓ(θ,h, p) =−(y − θx− β(u))2/2− log p(x,u).
It is straightforward to argue that the score function
for θ, the derivative of the log-likelihood in the least
favorable direction for estimating θ (cf. Schick, 1993;
Bickel et al., 1998), is given by
ℓ˜θ(θ,h) = (x− g(u))(y− θx− β(u)) = (x− g(u))ε,
and that the semiparametric information bound for
θ is
I = E[var(X|U)].
We assume that I > 0 (which implies, in particular,
that X is not a function of U ). Regarding estima-
tion of θ, intuition based on (2) says that for small
neighborhoods of u, the conditional expectation of
Y given X is linear with intercept β(u), and slope θ
which does not depend on the neighborhood. The ef-
ficient estimator should average the estimated slopes
over all such neighborhoods.
Indeed, under some regularity conditions, an effi-
cient estimator can be constructed along the follow-
ing lines. Find initial estimators g˜ and β˜ of g and β,
respectively, and estimate θ by computing
θˆ =
∑
(Xi − g˜(Ui))(Yi − β˜(Ui))∑
(Xi − g˜(Ui))2 .
The idea here is that θ is the regression coefficient
associated with regressing Y on X , conditioning on
the observed values of U . In order for this estimator
to be
√
n-consistent (or minimax), we need to as-
sume that the functions g and β are smooth enough
that we can estimate them at reasonable rates.
We could, for example, assume that the func-
tions β and g satisfy Ho¨lder conditions of order
α and δ, respectively. That is, there is a constant
0≤C <∞ such that |β(u)− β(v)| ≤C|u− v|α and
|g(u) − g(v)| ≤ C|u− v|δ for all u, v in the support
of U . We also need to assume that var(X|U) has
a version which is continuous in u. In this case, it
is proved in Wang, Brown and Cai (2011) that a
necessary and sufficient condition for the existence
of a
√
n-consistent and semiparametrically efficient
estimator of θ is that α+ δ > 1/2.
3.2 The Type I Bayesian Analysis
We assume that the type I Bayesian places inde-
pendent priors on p(u,x), β and θ, π = πp×πβ×πθ.
For example, the prior on the joint density may
be a function of the environment, the prior on the
nonparametric regression function might be a func-
tion of an underlying physical process, and the third
component of the prior might reflect our under-
standing of the measurement engineering. We have
already argued that such assumptions are plausible.
The log-posterior-density is then given by
−
n∑
i=1
(Yi− θXi− β(Ui))2/2 + logπθ(θ) + logπβ(β)
+
n∑
i=1
log p(Ui,Xi) + logπp(p) +A,
where A depends on the data only. Note that the
posterior for (θ, β) does not depend on p. The type
I Bayesian would use the same estimator regardless
of what is known about the smoothness of g.
Suppose now that, essentially, it is only known
that β is Ho¨lder of order α, while the range of U is
divided up into intervals such that, on each of them,
g is either Ho¨lder of order δ0 or of order δ1, with
α+ δ0 < 1/2< α+ δ1.
A
√
n-consistent estimator of θ can only make use
of data from the intervals on which g is Ho¨lder
of order of δ1. The rest should be discarded. Sup-
pose these intervals are disclosed to the statistician.
If the number of observations in the “good” inter-
vals is of the same order as n, then the estimator
is still
√
n-consistent. For a frequentist, there is no
difficulty in ignoring the nuisance intervals—θ is as-
sumed to be the same everywhere. However, the type
I Bayesian cannot ignore these intervals. In fact, his
posterior distribution cannot contain any informa-
tion on which intervals are good and which are bad.
More formally, let us consider a discrete version
of the partial linear model. Let the observations
be Zi = (Xi1,Xi2, Yi1, Yi2), with Z1, . . . ,Zn indepen-
dent. Suppose
Xi1 ∼ N(gi,1),
Xi2 ∼ N(gi + ηi,1),
Yi1 = θXi1 + βi + εi1,
Yi2 = θXi2 + βi + µi+ εi2,
εi1, εi2
i.i.d.∼ N(0,1),
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where Xi1,Xi2, εi1, εi2 are all independent, while
gi, ηi, βi, and µi are unknown parameters. We as-
sume that under the prior (g1, η1), . . . , (gn, ηn) are
i.i.d. independent of θ and the (β1, µ1), . . . , (βn, µn)
are i.i.d. This model is connected to the continu-
ous version, by considering isolated pairs of obser-
vations in the model with values differing by O(1/n).
The Ho¨lder conditions become ηi = OP (n
−δi), and
µi =OP (n
−α), where δi ∈ {δ0, δ1}, as above.
From a frequentist point of view, the (Xi1,Xi2, Yi1,
Yi2) have a joint normal distribution and we would
then consider the statistic[
Xi2 −Xi1
Yi2 − Yi1
]
∼N
([
ηi
θηi + µi
]
,
[
2 2θ
2θ 2θ2 +2
])
.
Now consider the estimator
θˆ =
∑
δi=δ1
(Xi2 −Xi1)(Yi2 − Yi1)∑
δi=δ1
(Xi2 −Xi1)2
= θ+
∑
δi=δ1
(Xi2 −Xi1)(εi2 − εi1)∑
δi=δ1
(Xi2 −Xi1)2
+
∑
δi=δ1
(Xi2 −Xi1)µi∑
δi=δ1
(Xi2 −Xi1)2
= θ+OP (n
−1/2) +R,
where
R=
∑
δi=δ1
ηiµi∑
δi=δ1
(Xi2 −Xi1)2 = oP (n
−1/2),
since α+ δ1 > 1/2.
Note that if the sum were over all pairs, and if
the number of pairs with δi = δ0 is of order n, then
the estimator would not be
√
n-consistent, since now√
nR diverges, almost surely. In general, this model
involves 2n + 1 parameters and the parameter of
interest cannot be estimated consistently unless the
nuisance parameters can be ignored, at least, asymp-
totically. However, these parameters can only be ig-
nored if we consider the smooth pairs—that is, those
pairs for which α + δi > 1/2, making the connec-
tion between variability, here, and smoothness, in
the first part of this section. Of course, the infor-
mation on which pairs to use in constructing the
estimator is unavailable to the type I Bayesian.
The type I Bayesian does not find any logical con-
tradiction in this failure. The parameter combina-
tions on which the Bayesian estimator fails to be√
n-consistent have negligible probability, a priori.
He assumes that a priori, β and g are independent
and short intervals are essentially independent since
β and g are very rough. Under these assumptions,
the intervals on which g is Ho¨lder of order δ0 con-
tribute, on average, 0 to the estimator. There are
no data in these intervals that contradict this a pri-
ori assessment. Hence, assumptions, made for conve-
nience in selecting the prior, dominate the inference.
The trouble is that, as discussed in Appendix A,
even if we assume a priori that β and g are indepen-
dent, their cross-correlation may be nonzero with
high probability, in spite of the fact that this ran-
dom cross-correlation has mean 0.
4. THE WHITE NOISE MODEL AND
BAYESIAN PLUG-IN PROPERTY
We now consider the white noise model in which
we observe the process
dX(t) = β(t)dt+ n−1/2 dW (t), t ∈ (0,1),
where β is an unknown L2-function and W (t) is
standard Brownian motion. This model is asymp-
totically equivalent to models in density estimation
and nonparametric regression; see Nussbaum (1996)
and Brown and Low (1996). It is also clear that this
model is equivalent to the model in which we observe
Xi = βi + n
−1/2εi,
(3)
εi
i.i.d.∼ N(0,1), i= 1,2, . . . ,
where Xi, βi and εi are the ith coefficients in an or-
thonormal (e.g., Fourier) series expansion of X(t),
β(t) and W (t), respectively. Note that the entire
sequence X1,X2, . . . is observed, and n serves only
as a scaling parameter. We are interested in es-
timating β = (β1, β2, . . .) as an object in ℓ2 with
the loss function ‖βˆ − β‖2 and linear functionals
θ = g(β) =
∑∞
i=1 giβi with (g1, g2, . . .) ∈ ℓ2, also un-
der squared error loss. From a standard frequentist
point of view, estimation in this problem is straight-
forward. Simple estimators achieving the optimal
rate of convergence are given in the following propo-
sition.
Proposition 4.1. Assume that β ∈ Bα = {β :
|βi| ≤ i−α} and α > 1/2. The estimator θ̂ =
∑
giXi
is
√
n-consistent for any g ∈ ℓ2 and the estimator
β̂i =
{
Xi, i
α ≤ n1/2,
0, iα > n1/2,
achieves the minimax rate of convergence, n−(2α−1)/2α.
The proof is given in Appendix B.
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4.1 The failure of Type I Bayesian analysis
A critical feature of Bayesian procedures for es-
timating linear functionals is that they necessarily
have the plug-in property (PIP). For example, for
squared error loss, since
Eg(β̂) =
n∑
i=1
giEβ̂i,
we have ĝ(β) = g(β̂), for any Bayesian estimators of
g(β) and β based on the same prior.
We say that β̂ is a uniformly efficient plug-in es-
timator for a set Θ of functionals and model P if{
r−2n ‖β̂ −β‖22 + n sup
θ∈Θ
(θ(β̂)− θ)2
}
=OP (1),
and θ̂ = θ(β̂) is semiparametrically efficient for θ,
where rn is the minimax rate for estimation of β.
Bickel and Ritov (2003) argued that there is no
uniformly efficient plug-in estimator in the white
noise model when Θ is large enough, for exam-
ple, the set of all bounded linear functionals. Ev-
ery plug-in estimator fails to achieve either the op-
timal nonparametric rate for estimating β or
√
n-
consistency as a plug-in-estimator (PIE) of at least
one bounded linear functional g(β). The argument
given in Bickel and Ritov (2003) that no estimator
with the PIP can be uniformly efficient in the white
noise model can be refined slightly as follows.
We need the following lemma; the proof of which
is given in Appendix B.
Lemma 4.2. Suppose X ∼ N(β,σ2), |β| ≤ a ≤
σ. Let β̂ = β̂(X) be the posterior mean when the
prior is π, assuming π is supported on [−a, a], and
let bβ be its bias under β. Then |bβ|+ |b−β|> 2(1−
(a/σ)2)|β|. In particular, if π is symmetric about 0,
then |bβ|> (1− (a/σ)2)|β|.
This lemma shows that any Bayesian estimator is
necessarily biased and puts a lower bound on this
bias. We use this lemma to argue that any Bayesian
estimator will fail to yield
√
n-consistent estimators
for at least one linear functional.
Theorem 4.3. For any Bayesian estimator β̂
with respect to prior π supported on Bα, with α> 1/2,
there is a pair (g,β) ∈ ℓ2 × Bα such that n[g(β̂)−
g(β)]2
p→∞. In fact, lim infn→∞ n(2α−1)/4α[Eβg(β̂)−
g(β)]> 0.
Proof. It follows from Lemma 4.2 that for any
i > 2n1/2α there are βi such that if bi = Eβ̂i−βi then
|bi|> 3i−α/4. Define
gi =
0, i≤ 2n
1/2α,
Cn(2α−1)/4αi−α, i > 2n1/2α, bi > i
−α/2,
−Cn(2α−1)/4αi−α, i > 2n1/2α, bi <−i−α/2,
where C is such that
∑∞
i=1 g
2
i = 1. (Note that C is
bounded away from 0 and ∞.) We have
E
[
∞∑
i=1
gi(β̂i − βi)
]
≥ 3Cn(2α−1)/4α
∑
i>2n1/2α
i−2α/4
≥ 3Cn−(2α−1)/4α/4. 
Thus, any Bayesian estimator will fail to achieve
optimal rates on some pairs (g,β). These pairs
are not unusual. Actually they are pretty “typical”
members of ℓ2 ×Bα. In fact, for any Bayesian esti-
mator β̂ and for almost all β with respect to the
distribution with independent uniform coordinates
on Bα, there is a g such that g(β̂) is inconsistent
and asymptotically biased, as in the theorem. For-
mally, let µ be a probability measure such that the
βi are independent and uniformly distributed on
[−i−α, i−α]. Then, for any sequence of Bayesian es-
timators, {β̂n},
lim inf
n→∞
µ
{
β : sup
g∈ℓ2
n(2α−1)/4α[Eβg(β̂n)
− g(β)]>M
}
= 1,
for some M > 0. This statement follows from the
proof of the Theorem 4.3, noting that µ{|bi| >
i−α/2}> 1/2.
What makes the pairs that yield inconsistent esti-
mators special, is only that the sequences β1, β2, . . .
and g1, g2, . . . are nonergodic. Each of them has a
nontrivial autocorrelation function, and the two au-
tocorrelation functions are similar (see Appendix A).
The prior suggests that such pairs are unlikely and,
therefore, that the biases of the estimators of each
component cancel each other out. If the prior distri-
bution represents a real physical phenomenon, this
exact cancelation might be reasonable to assume, by
the law of large numbers, and the statistician should
not worry about it. If, on the other hand, the prior
is a way to express ignorance or subjective belief,
then the analyst should worry about these small bi-
ases. This is particularly true if the only reason for
assuming that these small biases are not going to
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accumulate is mathematical convenience. Indeed, in
high-dimensional spaces, auto-correlation functions
may be complex, with unknown neighborhood struc-
tures which are completely hidden from the analyst.
We consider a Bayesian model to be honestly
nonparametric on Bα, if the distribution of βi,
given X−i, is symmetric around 0, and P (βi >
ǫi−α|X−i)> ǫ, for some ǫ > 0, where X−i =X1, . . . ,
Xi−1,Xi+1, . . . . That is, at least in some sense, all
the components of βi are free parameters. In this
case, we have the following.
Theorem 4.4. Let the prior π be honestly non-
parametric on Bα and 1/2 < α < 3/4. Suppose g =
(g1, g2, . . .) ∈ Bα, and lim sup
√
n|∑∞i=νn1/2α giβi| =
∞ for some ν > 1. Then the Bayesian estimator of
g(β) =
∑∞
i=1 giβi is not
√
n-consistent.
Note that if the last condition is not satisfied, then
an estimator that simply ignores the tails (i > n1/2α)
could be
√
n-consistent. However, for g,β ∈ Bα, in
general, all the first n1/(4α−2) terms must be used,
a number which is much greater than n1/2α for α in
the range considered.
Proof of Theorem 4.4. Again, we consider
the bias, as in the second part of Lemma 4.2. Under
our assumptions, we have
√
n
∣∣∣∣ ∑
i>νn1/2α
gi(Eβ̂i − βi)
∣∣∣∣
=
√
n
∣∣∣∣ ∑
i>νn1/2α
(1− di)giβi
∣∣∣∣ (0≤ di ≤ ni−2α)
≥√n
∣∣∣∣ ∑
i>νn1/2α
giβi
∣∣∣∣−√n ∑
i>νn1/2α
n|giβi|i−2α
≥√n
∣∣∣∣ ∑
i>νn1/2α
giβi
∣∣∣∣−√n ∑
i>νn1/2α
ni−4α
=
√
n
∣∣∣∣ ∑
i>νn1/2α
giβi
∣∣∣∣− o(1).

Note that the assumptions of the theorem are nat-
ural if the prior corresponds to the situation in which
the βi tend to 0 slowly, so that we need essentially
all the available observations to estimate g(β) at the√
n-rate. As in the last two examples, if either βi or
gi converges to 0 quickly enough—that is, β or g
are smooth enough—then the difficulty disappears,
as the tails do not contribute much to the functional
g(β) and they can be ignored. However, when the
prior is supported on Bα, then the estimator β̂i =Xi
is unavailable to the Bayesian (whatever the prior)
and g(β) cannot be estimated at the minimax rate
with g ∈ Bα, much less ℓ2.
4.2 Type II Analysis
It is easy to construct priors which give the global
and local minimax rates separately. For the non-
parametric part β, one can select a prior for which
the βi are independent and the estimator of βi based
on Xi ∼N(βi, n−1) with βi restricted to the inter-
val [−i−α, i−α] is minimax; see Bickel (1981). For
the parametric part, one can use an improper prior
under which the βi are independent and uniformly
distributed on the real line. This prior works, but
it completely ignores the constraints on the coor-
dinates of β. If one permits priors which are not
supported on the parameter space, then this prior is
perfect, in the sense that any linear functional can
be estimated at the minimax rate.
If we are permitted to work with a prior which is
not supported by the parameter space, then we can
construct a prior which yields good estimators for
both β and any particular linear functional. Indeed,
suppose that gi 6= 0, infinitely often, and change
bases so that X˜ =B′X , where B is an orthonormal
basis for ℓ2 with first column equal to g/‖g‖. Note
that X˜1 =
∑∞
j=1 gjXj/‖g‖ and the X˜i are indepen-
dent, with X˜i ∼N(β˜i, n−1), i= 0,1, . . . , where β˜1 is
the parameter of interest, and ‖β˜‖2 = ‖β‖2. Thus,
a Bayesian who places a flat prior on θ = β˜1 and a
standard nonparametric prior on the other coordi-
nates of β˜, such that β˜i is estimated by X˜i, properly
thresholded, will be able to estimate θ efficiently and
(β˜2, β˜3, . . .) at the minimax rate, simultaneously; cf.
Zhao (2000). Of course, this prior was tailor-made
for the specific functional θ = g(β) and would yield
estimators of other linear functionals which are not√
n-consistent, should the posterior be put to such
a task.
4.3 An Example
To demonstrate that the effects described above
have real, practical consequences, consider the fol-
lowing example. Take β = vec(M0) and g= vec(M1),
where M0 and M1 are the two images shown in Fig-
ure 1(a) and (d), respectively. That is, each image
is represented by the matrix of the gray scale levels
of the pixels, and vec(M) is the vector obtained by
piling the columns of M together to obtain a single
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vector. These images were sampled at random from
the images which come bundled in the standard dis-
tribution of Matlab. The images have been modified
slightly, so they both have the same 367 × 300 ge-
ometry, but nothing else has been done to them.
To each element of β, we added an independent
N(0,169) random variable. This gives us X , shown
in Figure 1(b). Let π be that prior which takes the βi
i.i.d. N(µ, τ2), where µ=
∑
wiβi/
∑
wi, with wi in-
dependent and identically uniformly-distributed on
(0,1) and τ2 = 315.786, the true empirical variance
of the βi. The resulting nonparametric Bayesian es-
timator is shown in Figure 1(c). The mean squared
error (MSE) of this Bayesian estimator is approx-
imately 65% smaller than that of the MLE. Now
consider the functional defined by g, shown in Fig-
ure 1(d). Applying g to X yields an estimator
with root mean squared error (RMSE) of 1.04, but
plugging-in the much cleaner Bayesian estimator
of Figure 1(c) gives an estimator with a RMSE
of 19.01, almost twenty times worse than the fre-
quentist estimator. Of course, the biggest difference
between these two estimators is bias: 0.01 for the fre-
quentist versus 19.00 for the Bayesian. These RMSE
calculations were based on 1000 Monte Carlo simu-
lations.
There is no reason to suspect that these images
are correlated—they were sampled at random from
an admittedly small collection of images—and they
are certainly unrelated, one image shows the results
of an astrophysical fluid jet simulation and the other
is an image of the lumbar spine, but neither is per-
mutation invariant nor ergodic, and this implies that
the two images may be strongly positively or neg-
atively correlated, just by chance; see Figure 2 and
Appendix A.
5. ESTIMATING THE NORM OF A
HIGH-DIMENSIONAL VECTOR
We continue with our analysis of the white noise
model, but we consider a different, nonlinear Eu-
clidean parameter of interest: θ =
∑∞
i=1 β
2
i .
A natural estimator of βi is given in Proposi-
tion 4.1, and one may consider a plug-in estimator
of the parameter, given by θ˜ =
∑
β˜2i =
∑
i<n1/2αX
2
i .
This estimator achieves the minimax rate for esti-
mating β and θ˜ is an efficient estimator of the Eu-
clidean parameter, so long as α> 1. But β˜2i has bias
Fig. 1. Estimating linear functionals: (a) the vector β; (b) the observations X; (c) the Bayesian estimator; (d) the func-
tional g.
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Fig. 2. A scatter plot and histograms of the data X and functional g. (a) A scatter plot of 5% of all pairs, chosen at random.
(b) Joint and marginal histograms.
1/n as an estimator of β2i . Summing i from 1 to n,
we see that the total bias is n−1+1/2α, which is much
larger than n−1/2 if α < 1. The traditional solution
to this problem is to simply unbias the estimator;
cf. Bickel and Ritov (1988).
Proposition 5.1. Suppose 3/4 < α < 1, then
an efficient estimator of θ is given by
θ̂ =
∑
i≤m
(X2i − n−1),(4)
for n1/(4α−2) <m≤ n.
Proof. Clearly, the bias of the estimator is
bounded by∑
i>m
i−2α <m−(2α−1) = oP (n
−1/2),
and its variance is bounded by
n−1
∑
i≤m
(4β2i +2/n) = 4θn
−1+ oP (n
−1),
demonstrating
√
n-consistency. The estimator is ef-
ficient since θˆ is asymptotically normal, and 1/4θ is
the semiparametric information for the estimation
of θ. 
This is a standard frequentist approach: there is
a problem and the solution is justified because it
works—it produces an asymptotically efficient es-
timator of the parameter of interest—not because
it fits a particular paradigm. The difficulty with
the naive, plug-in estimator
∑
i≤m βˆ
2
i =
∑
i≤mX
2
i is
that it is biased, but this is a problem that is easy
to correct. Of course, this simple fix is not available
to the Bayesian, as we show next.
5.1 The Bayesian Analysis: An Even Simpler
Model
We start with a highly simplified version of the
white noise model. To avoid confusion, we change
notation slightly and consider
Y1, . . . , Yk independent with Yi ∼N(µi, σ2),(5)
θ = θ(µ1, . . . , µk;g1, . . . , gk) =
k∑
i=1
giµ
2
i ,(6)
where the gi are known constants. Here, we consider
the asymptotic performance of estimators of θ with
σ2 = σ2k → 0 as k→∞. Let
θ̂ =
k∑
i=1
gi(Y
2
i − σ2).
Clearly,
Eθ̂ = θ, var θ̂ = 4σ2
k∑
i=1
g2i µ
2
i + 2σ
4
k∑
i=1
g2i .
Suppose that the µi are a priori i.i.d. N(0, τ
2),
with τ2 = τ2k known, and consider the situation in
which g1 ∼ · · · ∼ gk. If k−1/2σ2k ≪ τ2k ≪ σ2k, then the
signal-to-noise ratio τ2/σ2 is strictly less than 1 and
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no estimator of µi performs much better than sim-
ply setting µ̂i = 0. On the other hand, θ̂ remains
a good estimator of θ, with coefficient of variation,
O(
√
kσ2/kτ2), converging to 0. We call this para-
doxical regime the nonlocalizable range, as we can
estimate global parameters, like θ, but not the local
parameters, µ1, . . . , µk.
A posteriori, the µi ∼ N(τ2Yi/(σ2 + τ2), τ2σ2/
(σ2 + τ2)) and the Bayesian estimator of θ is given
by
k∑
i=1
giE(µ
2
i |Yi) =
σ4 +2τ2σ2
(σ2 + τ2)2
k∑
i=1
g2i τ
2
+
τ4
(σ2 + τ2)2
k∑
i=1
gi(Yi− σ2).
This expression has the structure of a Bayesian es-
timator in exponential families: a weighted average
of the prior mean and the unbiased estimator. If the
signal-to-noise ratio is small, τ2≪ σ2, almost all the
weight is put on the prior. This is correct, since the
variance of θ, under the prior, is much smaller than
the variance of the unbiased estimator. So, if we re-
ally believe the prior, the data can be ignored at
little cost. However, in frequentist terms, the esti-
mator is severely biased and, for a type II Bayesian,
nonrobust.
The Achilles heel of the Bayesian approach is
the plug-in property. That is, E(
∑m
i=1 µ
2
i |data) =∑m
i=1 E(µ
2
i |data). However, when the signal-to-noise
ratio is infinitesimally small, any Bayesian estima-
tor must employ shrinkage. Note that, in particu-
lar, the unbiased estimator Y 2i −σ2 of µ2i cannot be
Bayesian, because it is likely to be negative and is
an order of magnitude larger than µ2i .
A “natural” fix to the nonrobustness of the i.i.d.
prior, is to introduce a hyperparameter. Let τ2 be
an unknown parameter, with some smooth prior.
Marginally, under the prior, Y1, . . . , Yk are i.i.d.
N(0, σ2+ τ2). By standard calculations, it is easy to
see that the MLE of τ2 is τ̂2 = k−1
∑k
i=1(Y
2
i − σ2).
By the Bernstein–von Mises theorem, the Bayesian
estimator of τ2 must be within oP (k
−1/2) of τ̂2. If
g1 = · · ·= gk and we plug τ = τ̂ into the formula for
the Bayesian estimator, we get a weighted average
of two estimators of θ, both of which are equal to θ̂.
But, in general, τ̂ is strictly different from θ̂ and this
estimator is inconsistent. Of course, the Bayesian es-
timator is not obtained by plugging-in the estimated
value of τ , but the difference would be small here,
and the Bayesian estimator would perform poorly.
We can, of course, select the prior so that the
marginal variance is directly relevant to estimating
θ. One way to do this is to assume that τ2 has some
smooth prior and, given τ2, the µi are i.i.d. N(0,
(τ2/gi) − σ2). Then Yi ∼ N(0, τ2/gi), marginally,
and the marginal log-likelihood function is
−k log(τ2)/2−
k∑
i=1
giY
2
i /2τ
2.
In this case, τ̂2 = k−1
∑k
i=1 giY
2
i and the posterior
mean of
∑k
i=1 giµ
2
i is approximately
∑k
i=1 gi(τ̂
2/gi−
σ2) =
∑k
i=1 gi(Y
2
i − σ2), as desired.
This form of the prior variance for the µi is
not accidental. Suppose, more generally, that µi ∼
N(0, τ2i (ρ)), a priori, for some hyperparameter ρ.
Then the score equation for ρ̂ is
∑k
i=1wi(ρ̂)Y
2
i =∑k
i=1wi(ρ̂) · (τi(ρ̂) + σ2), where wi(ρ) = τi(ρ)τ˙i(ρ)/
(τi(ρ̂) + σ
2)2. If we want the weight wi to be pro-
portional to gi, then we get a simple differential
equation, the general solution of which is given by
(τi(ρ)+σ
2)−1 = giρ+ di. Hence, the general form of
the prior variance is
τ2i (ρ) = (giρ+ di)
−1 − σ2.
The prior suggested above simply takes di = 0, for
all i. If the type II Bayesian really believes that all
the µi should have some known prior variance τ
2
0 ,
he can take di = (τ
2
0 + σ
2)−1 − gi, obtaining the ex-
pression
τ2i (ρ) =
τ20 + (ρ− 1)(τ2 + σ2)σ2gi
1 + (ρ− 1)(τ2 + σ2)σ2gi .
If the variance of the µi really is τ
2
0 , then the pos-
terior for the hyperparameter ρ will concentrate on
1 and the τ2i will concentrate on τ
2
0 . If, on the other
hand, τ2 is unknown, the resulting estimator will
still perform well, although the expression for τ2i is
quite arbitrary.
The discussion above holds when we are interested
in estimating the hyperparameter
∑k
i=1 giτ
2
i (ρ).
This is a legitimate change in the rules and the
resulting estimator can be used to estimate θ in the
nonlocalizable regime, because the main contribu-
tion to the estimator is the contribution of the prior,
conditioning on τ2i (ρ). However, when τ
2
i (ρ) ≈ σ2,
there may be a clear difference between the Bayesian
estimators of
∑k
i=1 τ
2
i (ρ) and
∑k
i=1 µ
2
i , respectively.
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We conjecture that a construction based on strat-
ification might be used to avoid the problems dis-
cussed above: the use of an unnatural prior and the
difference between estimating the hyperparameter
and estimating the norm. In this case, we would
stratify based on the values of the gi and estimate∑
µ2i separately in each stratum. The price paid by
such an estimator is a large number of hyperparam-
eters and a prior suited to a very specific task.
The discussion above shows that θ̂ can at least
be approximated by a Bayesian estimator, but the
corresponding prior has to have a specific form and
would have to have been chosen for convenience
rather than prior belief. This presents no difficulty
for the type II Bayesian, who is free to select his
prior to achieve a particular goal. However, prob-
lems with the prior remain. The prior is tailor-made
for a specific problem: while β1, . . . , βk i.i.d. N(0, τ
2)
is a very good prior for estimating
∑k
i=1 µ
2
i , when
the parameter of interest is not permutation invari-
ant, the estimator is likely to perform poorly in fre-
quentist terms. Also, the prior is appropriate for reg-
ular models but not sparse ones. Consider again the
nonlocalizable regime in which
√
kσ2 ≪ θ ≪ kσ2,
but suppose that most of the µi are very close to
zero, with only a few taking values larger than σ2 in
absolute value. A Bayesian estimator based on the
prior suggested above will shrink all the Yi toward
0, strongly biasing the estimates of the µi, whereas
a standard (soft or hard) thresholding estimator will
have much better performance. A completely differ-
ent prior is needed to deal with sparsity. See Green-
shtein, Park and Ritov (2008) and van der Pas and
Kleijn (2014) for an empirical Bayes solution to the
sparsity problem.
5.2 A Bayesian Analysis of the White Noise
Model
Returning to original model, Xi ∼ N(βi,1/n),
|βi| < i−α, with θ =
∑n
i=1 β
2
i , we can use a prior
for which the βi are i.i.d. N(0, τ
2), for i= 1, . . . ,m,
and 0, otherwise, where m = n1/(4α−2)+ν , for some
ν > 0. This gives us a Bayesian estimator of θ which
is asymptotically equivalent to the unbiased estima-
tor, θ̂ =
∑n
i=1(X
2
i − n−1), and asymptotically effi-
cient. However, the corresponding estimator for β
is not even consistent and, when we try to esti-
mate βi, even for i relatively small, we see that the
Bayesian estimator shrinks Xi toward 0 by a fac-
tor of 1 − ρ where ρ is asymptotically larger than
θm/n = θn−(4α−3)/(4α−2)−ν ≫ n−1/2. So our esti-
mate of βi fails to be
√
n-consistent.
A more reasonable approach, in this situation,
is to partition the set X1, . . . ,Xn into blocks,
{Xkj−1 , . . . ,Xkj}, j = 1, . . . , J , and use a mean-
zero Gaussian prior with unknown variance in each
of the blocks. One possible assignment is k0 = 1,
k1 = o(
√
n), and kj = 2kj−1, j > 1. Thus, O(logn)
blocks are needed. The analysis presented above
shows that this prior would yield a good estima-
tor of θ without, hopefully, sacrificing our ability
to estimate the βi at the
√
n-rate. Of course, this
prior is not supported on the parameter space Bα:
it forces uniform shrinkage of the observations in
each block (and bypasses the plug-in property by
estimating block-wise hyperparameters). But there
is nothing “natural” about these blocks and nothing
in the problem statement suggests this grouping.
As before, this “objective” prior was constructed
with a specific parameter in mind and is unlikely to
be effective for other parameters; it cannot represent
prior beliefs. The prior will also fail when sparsity
makes the block structure inappropriate. The un-
biased, frequentist estimator has no such difficulty.
The Bayesian is obliged to conform to the plug-in
principle and, because of this, at some stage, must
get stuck with the wrong prior for some parameter
which was not considered interesting initially.
Consider a general prior π. Let πi be the prior
for βi given X−i = (X1, . . . ,Xi−1,Xi+1, . . .). For
i > n1/2α+ν with ν > 0 arbitrarily small and m =
n1/(4α−2)+ν , as in Proposition 5.1,
Eπ(β
2
i |X1, . . . ,Xm)
=
∫ i−α
−i−α t
2ϕ(n(Xi − t))dπi(t)∫ i−α
−i−α ϕ(n(Xi − t))dπi(t)
(7)
∈ (a−1Eπiβ2i , aEπiβ2i ),
where for I = {i : n1/2+ν < i≤ n1/(4α−2)+ν},
max
i∈I
log a≤ max
i∈I
|ti|<i−α
n|(Xi − t1)2 − (Xi − t2)2| p→ 0,
since maxi∈I n
1/2−ν |Xi| p→ 0. But this means that
the estimate of β2i depends only weakly on Xi it-
self. It is mainly a function of X−i and the prior.
Moreover, if the estimate of θ is to be close to the
unbiased one, then this must be achieved through
the influence of Xi on the estimates of βj , for j 6= i.
This is the case in the construction above where
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formally we are estimating a hyperparameter of the
prior, rather than θ, itself. The result is a nonrobust
estimator which works for the particular functional
of interest but not others. In fact, we have the fol-
lowing theorem.
Theorem 5.2. Let β−i = (β1, . . . , βi−1, βi+1,
. . .). Let π be the prior on β. Suppose that there
is an η > 0 such that a.s. under the prior π:
Pπ(⌈4i2αβ2i ⌉ = κ|β−i) > η, i = 1,2, . . . , and κ =
1, . . . ,4. There exists a set S = Sn with π(Sn)→ 1,
such that for all β ∈ S there is a sequence g1, g2, . . . ,
for which the Bayesian estimator of
∑
giβ
2
i with re-
spect to π is not
√
n-consistent.
The proof is given in Appendix B. The conditions
in the theorem are needed to ensure that support of
the prior does not degenerate to a finite-dimensional
parametric model.
6. DATA-DEPENDENT SAMPLE SIZES AND
STOPPING TIMES
The stopping rule principle (SRP) says that, in
a sequential experiment, with final data xN (τ), in-
ferences should not depend on the stopping time
τ ; see Berger and Wolpert (1988). In so much as
Bayesian techniques follow the strong likelihood
principle (SLP), they must also follow the SRP.
To see that high dimensional data represents a
challenge for the SRP, consider another version of
the white noise model. Let n−2α < βi < 3n
−2α, i=
1, . . . , k = ⌊n2α⌋, and 1/6 < α< 1/4. Suppose that,
for each i, Xi(·) is a Brownian motion with drift βi,
and that Xi is observed until some random time Ti.
Take X¯i(t) =Xi(t)/t and note that this is the suffi-
cient statistic for βi given {Xi(s) : s < t}. Of course,
X¯i is also the MLE. Finally, let πi be the prior for
βi given X−i = (X1, . . . ,Xi−1,Xi+1, . . .). Let fi(·) be
the density of the distribution of Xi(Ti) given X−i;
fi = πi ∗N(0,1/Ti). We assume that the prior πi is
non-parametric in the sense that πi is bounded away
from 0 on the allowed support, so that X−i does not
give us too much information about βi.
It is well known that the posterior mean of βi
given the data satisfies
E(βi|data) = X¯i(Ti) + 1
Ti
f ′i(Xi(Ti))
fi(Xi(Ti))
.
If Ti = O(n), then fi ≈ πi and X¯i(Ti) ≈ βi. Sup-
pose Ti is correlated with gi(βi), where gi = f
′
i/fi,
then the MLE of
∑k
i=1 βi, given by
∑k
i=1Xi(Ti) is
unbiased and has a random error on the order of
nαn−1/2, while the Bayesian estimator has a bias
which is ∼ n2αn2α/n, with n2α terms each contribut-
ingO(n2α) to the bias, from gi, and a term of O(1/n)
from 1/Ti. With 1/6<α< 1/4, the Bayes bias dom-
inates the random error.
6.1 An Example
We consider again the vector β represented in
Figure 1(a), but this time the vectorized version
of the spine image shown in Figure 1(d) is used to
specify the random number of observations associ-
ated with each element of β. Adding noise to Fig-
ure 1(a), we get the observed data and MLE, shown
in Figure 3(a). This SNR is higher here than before
(+2.72 db) and, as a result, the Bayesian estimator
shown in Figure 3(b) is much smoother.
Here, we used a prior with independent Gaussian
components, each with a mean equal to the mean of
β and variance equal to the variance of the βi. We
have two processes on the unit square: one repre-
sents β and the other corresponds to random stop-
ping times, with the number of observations propor-
tional to the gray-scale value of the corresponding
pixel in the image of the spine. As we have already
seen, these images are correlated, although there is
Fig. 3. (a) the MLE; (b) the Bayesian estimator.
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no reason, a priori, to expect they would be, having
been chosen at random from a collection of unre-
lated images. This correlation causes trouble: In 500
Monte Carlo simulations, the RMSE of the Bayesian
estimator of the sum of the βi is 0.05, whereas the
RMSE of the MLE is 0.009. The difference is due
almost entirely to bias. If we replace the stopping
times with a fixed time, the Bayesian estimator per-
forms better, achieving a RMSE of 0.0071 versus the
RMSE of the MLE = 0.0072. This example shows
clearly that the Bayesian estimator can be badly
biased when the stopping times and the unknown
parameters happen to be correlated.
7. BAYESIAN PROCEDURES ARE EFFICIENT
UNDER BAYESIAN ASSUMPTIONS
Freedman (1965) proves that in some very weak
sense consistency of Bayesian procedures is “rare.”
We, however, start with a version of Doob’s con-
sistency result and show that the existence of a
uniformly
√
n-consistent estimator ensures that the
posterior distribution is
√
n-consistent with prior
probability 1.
To simplify notation, we consider the Markov
chain β0 → Xn → βn, where β0, βn ∈ B, β0 ∼ π,
Xn ∼ Pβ0 , and given Xn, β0 and βn are i.i.d. That
is, given Xn, βn is distributed according to the pos-
terior distribution πXn . Let P be the joint distri-
bution of the chain. With some abuse of notation,
Pβ0 is also the conditional distribution of the chain
given that it starts at β0. Let dn be a semi-metric on
the parameter space, normalized to the sample size.
Typically, in the nonparametric situation considered
in this paper, dn(β,β
′) =
√
n|θ(β)− θ(β′)| for some
real-valued functional θ of the parameter.
We consider an estimator β˜n to be dn consis-
tent uniformly on B, if for every ε > 0 there is an
M <∞ such that for all β ∈ B and n large enough,
Pβ{dn(β˜n, β)≥M} ≤ ε. The posterior is dn consis-
tent uniformly on B if for every ε > 0 there is an
M <∞ such that for all β0 ∈ B and n large enough,
Pβ0{dn(βn, β0)≥M} ≤ ε.
Thus, we consider the inference to be dn uni-
formly consistent if the frequentist Markov chain,
β0→Xn→ β˜n, or the Bayesian one, β0→Xn→ βn
lands in an Op(1) dn-ball about β0.
Theorem 7.1. Suppose there is an estimator
which is dn consistent uniformly on B. Then there
is a B′ ⊆B such that π(B′) = 1 and the posterior is
dn consistent uniformly on B′.
The proof is given in Appendix B.
Thus, the existence of a uniformly good frequen-
tist estimator ensures that the there is a set with
prior probability one such that the Bayes posterior
is uniformly consistent at the right rate on that set.
The difficulty with this statement is that, in high
dimensional spaces, there is no natural extension
of Lebesgue measure and null sets of very natural-
looking priors are sometimes much larger than one
would expect. For a simple example, consider a prior
with hyperparameters of the type we considered for
the white noise models: τ has standard exponen-
tial distribution, and βi, . . . , βk are, given τ , i.i.d.
N(0, τ2). Consider the set S = {β : k−1∑ki=1(βi −
β¯k)
4 < 2.5(k−1
∑k
i=1(βi − β¯k)2)2}. The probability
of S is 0.82 if k = 5. It drops to approximately 0.27
when k = 50. It is 0.0025 for k = 500, and negli-
gible when k = 5000. (These numbers are based on
100,000 Matlab simulations.) The set S is not so un-
usual or unexpected that it can be really ignored a
priori and, unlike most sets, S is simple to compre-
hend. If inferences depend on whether or not the
fourth moment of the parameter is exactly three
times the square of the second, as implied by the
normality assumption, which was made for conve-
nience, these inferences would not be robust.
Theorem 7.1 does not contradict our findings. In
the stratified sampling and partial linear model ex-
amples of Sections 2 and 3, the difference between
the Bayesian estimator and the frequentist one is
that the former ignores the information that re-
stricts the model to a subset of the parameter space
which has prior probability 0. In the white noise
models of Sections 4 and 5, the requirement that the
prior be “honestly nonparametric” limits β1, β2, . . .
to regular sequences obeying a law of large numbers
and, as a result, the set of non-ergodic sequences is
given prior probability 0. And, in these examples,
there are two phenomena which make this theorem
irrelevant. First, Bayesian estimators must obey the
plug-in principle, restricting estimators to those of
the form θ(β˜) for β˜ ∈ B, while the frequentist esti-
mator cannot be written in this form. Second, each
prior fails for a different functional, but if the func-
tional and the parameter are chosen together, as we
have argued might well happen, this theorem has no
consequences.
The second result of this section gives an easy ab-
stract construction which shows that, under some
conditions, a type II Bayesian is able to choose a
prior with good frequentist properties. Our setup is
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as follows. In the nth problem, we observe X(n) ∼
P ∈ P(n) ≪ ν, with density p = dP/dν. Estima-
tors take values in the set A, and a loss function
ℓn :P(n)×A→R+ is used to assess the “cost” asso-
ciated with a particular estimate. We assume that
ℓn is bounded by Ln <∞ for all n and that:
A1. The loss function is Lipschitz: for all a ∈A and
P,P ′ ∈ P(n): |ℓn(P,a)− ℓn(P ′, a)| ≤ cn‖p− pn‖,
where ‖ · ‖ is the variational norm.
A2. Given ε > 0 there exists a finite set P(n)K ⊂P(n)
with cardinality κn,ε, such that
sup
P∈P(n)
inf
P ′∈P
(n)
K
‖P −P ′‖ ≤ ε.
A3. Let Rn(P, δ) = EP ℓn(P, δ(X)), where δ :X (n)→
A, or more generally, δ is a randomized pro-
cedure (or Markov kernel from X (n) to A). Let
Rn(δ) = supP∈P(n) Rn(P, δ). There exist δ
∗ such
that Rn(δ
∗) = infδRn(δ)≡ rn ≤ r <∞ for all n.
Let µn be a probability measure on P(n)K . The cor-
responding posterior distribution is µn(Pj |X(n)) =
µn(Pj)pj(X
(n))/
∑κ
k=1µn(Pk)pk(X
(n)). Let δµn be
the Bayesian procedure with respect to µn.
Theorem 7.2. If conditions A1–A3 hold, then
for all ε′ > 0, there exist µn,ε′ on P(n), such that
Rn(δµn,ε′ )≤ rn + ε′.
The proof is given in Appendix B and can be used
to argue that, under the conditions above, it is al-
ways possible (for a type II Bayesian) to select a
prior such that the corresponding Bayesian proce-
dure estimates both the global and local parameters
at their minimax rates.
Corollary 7.3. Consider an estimation prob-
lem in which P(n) satisfies the conditions of Theo-
rem 7.2; ℓ1n(P,a), ℓ2n(P,a) are two loss functions,
each satisfying condition A1, with Lipschitz con-
stants c1n and c2n, respectively, and
inf
δ
max
P∈P(n)
EP ℓkn(P, δ) =O(b
−1
kn ), k = 1,2,
for some b1n, b2n. Then, given ε > 0, there exist µn
on P(n) such that simultaneously
max
P∈P(n)
EP ℓkn(P, δµn) =O(b
−1
kn ), k = 1,2.
The corollary follows by applying the theorem
to the combined loss function ℓn(P, (a1, a2)) =
b1nℓ1n(P,a1) + b2nℓ2n(P,a2).
The conditions essentially hold in our examples
(technically, in the stratified sampling and partial
linear model examples, before applying the theorem,
one should restrict the parameter space to a com-
pact set). However, note that the prior may depend
on information that may not be known a priori, such
as the loss function, and on parameters that “should
not” be part of the loss, such as the weight function
in the stratified sampling example, the (smoothness
of the) conditional expectation of U given X in the
partial linear model, and the linear functional in the
white noise model.
Note, however, that the theorem as proven does
not say that there exists a prior such that the two
Bayesian estimators for each of the two loss func-
tions achieve the corresponding minimax rates. In-
deed, a single estimator is produced which balances
the two objectives.
8. SUMMARY
In this paper, we presented a few toy examples in
which a nonparametric prior fails to produce estima-
tors of simple functionals that are
√
n-consistent, in
spite of the fact that efficient frequentist procedures
exist (and are often easy to construct). In these ex-
amples, minimal smoothness was assumed, but we
do not believe that this is necessary in order for
the Bayesian paradigm to have difficulty with high-
dimensional models. With minimal smoothness, it is
easy to prove that bias accumulates and global func-
tionals cannot be estimated at minimax rates (while
with smoother objects, this would be more difficult
to demonstrate).
Bayesian procedures are always unbiased with
the respect to the prior on which they are based.
Bayesian estimators tend to replace parameters
buried in noise by their a priori means. This would
be a reasonable strategy if the prior represented
a physical reality, but is not workable if the prior
represents a subjective belief or is selected for com-
putational convenience. In the latter case, to the
extent that the beliefs or assumptions fail to match
the physical reality, the Bayesian paradigm will run
into difficulty.
Several difficulties with the Bayesian approach
were demonstrated by our examples, including:
1. The possibility of de facto cross-correlation be-
tween two independent processes, as discussed in
Appendix A, is ignored by the Bayesian estima-
tor. The effect of such spurious correlations can
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be seen in the stratified sampling example of Sec-
tion 2, the partial linear model of Section 3, and
the discussion on estimating linear functionals in
the white noise model of Section 4. Because the
spurious correlations observed have mean value
0, the Bayesian estimators are unbiased, on aver-
age, but this average is only with respect to the
prior. In any other sense, the Bayesian estimators
are biased.
2. For linear functionals with squared error loss, the
Bayesian paradigm requires the analyst to follow
the plug-in principle, estimating functionals θ of
high-dimensional parameters β by θ˜ = θ(β˜). The
fact that universal plug-in estimators do not ex-
ist shows that strict adherence to the Bayesian
paradigm is too rigid. This was shown in Sec-
tion 4.
3. Having selected a prior, the Bayesian may assume
that some functionals of the unknown parame-
ter are known—for example, weighted means of
many unknown parameters. But, as a matter of
fact, these unverified assumptions, hidden in the
selected prior, force the resulting estimator to be
nonrobust. See, for example, the discussion of the
partial linear model in Section 3.
4. On the other hand, replacing components of sig-
nal buried deeply in noise by their prior means
may cause an accumulation of bias, destroying
estimators of functionals which can be estimated
without bias and with bounded asymptotic vari-
ance. This is clear from the discussion in Sec-
tion 5.
5. Finally, the Bayesian paradigm forces the analyst
to follow the strict likelihood principle, cf. Berger
and Wolpert (1988), and this may force him to
ignore auxiliary information which could be used
to produce asymptotically unbiased, efficient es-
timators. This was the core of the argument in
the stratified sampling example of Section 2 in
which the type I Bayesian cannot make use of
information on the sampling probabilities, at all,
and cannot produce a
√
n-consistent estimator of
the population mean, in general, as a result. The
same is true in the partial linear model example
of Section 3, in which the type I Bayesian analyst
cannot make use of information on smoothness,
and in the stopping times example of Section 6.
Real-life examples are more complex and less
tractable than the toy problems we have played with
in this paper and, as a result, it would be more
difficult to determine the real-life effect of assump-
tions hidden in the prior on the frequentist behav-
ior of Bayesian estimators in such situations. It is
very difficult to build a prior for a very complicated
model. Typically, one would assume a lot of indepen-
dence. However, with many independent or nearly-
independent components, the law of large numbers
and central limit theorem will take effect, concen-
trating what was supposed to have been a vague
prior in a small corner of the parameter space. The
resulting estimator will be efficient for parameters
in this small set, but not in general. It is safe to say
that Bayes is not curse of dimensionality appropri-
ate (or CODA, see Robins and Ritov, 1997).
APPENDIX A: INDEPENDENT BUT
CORRELATED SERIES
Much of the analysis in this paper is based on
presenting counterexamples on which a given es-
timation procedure fails. This is satisfactory from
a minimax frequentist point of view: one exam-
ple is enough to argue that the result depends on
the unknown parameter and is not uniformly valid,
or asymptotically minimax. However, this may not
convince a Bayesian, who might claim that the
counter example is a priori unreasonable. A typical
example of the argument was presented in the strat-
ified sampling example of Section 2. This argument
can be characterized by constructing two a priori in-
dependent processes (β and g), which happen to be
“similar.” For the Bayesian, this is a very unlikely
event. After all, he assumes that they are indepen-
dent; for example, one of them depends on biology
and the other on budget constraints. In this section,
we argue that such correlations can actually be quite
likely. Harmeling and Toussaint (2007) write: “Let
us now get to the core of Robins and Ritov (1997).
The authors consider uniform unbiasedness of an es-
timator. This means that the estimator has to be
unbiased for every possible choice of θ and ξ. In the
experiment, we performed above, though, we chose
θ and ξ independently, and thus it was very unlikely
that we ended up with an accidentally correlated θ
and ξ, for example, where θ tends to be large when-
ever also ξ is (or inversely).” (We should remark that
they consider also a scenario in which the processes
are correlated.) We claim that this criticism ignores
the fact that two processes can be independent and
yet, with high probability, have an empirical cross-
correlation which is far from 0. This would be the
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case, for example, if the processes are nonergodic
and have similar autocorrelation functions.
Suppose U1, . . . ,Un and V1, . . . , Vn are two in-
dependent simple random walks. Then of course
Un and Vn are uncorrelated. But we may con-
sider the correlation between these two series R =
n−1
∑n
i=1(Ui − U¯n)(Vi − V¯n), where U¯n and V¯n are
the empirical means of the two series, respectively.
R is a random variable and clearly it has mean 0.
However, it is far from being close to 0, even if n
is large. In fact, asymptotically, R is almost uni-
formly distributed on most of the interval (−1,1);
cf. McShane and Wyner (2011). The reason for this
somewhat surprising fact is that random walks and
Brownian motions are less wild than they are some-
times thought to be. In fact given Un, the best pre-
dictor of U⌊n/2⌋ is Un/2, where ⌊a⌋ is the largest in-
teger less than a, and the sequence tends to be, very
roughly speaking, monotone. But if both U1, . . . ,Un
and V1, . . . , Vn are “somewhat” monotone, then they
will be cross-correlated; maybe positively correlated,
maybe negatively, but rarely uncorrelated. Consider
now two general, independent mean 0 random, non-
mixing sequences U1, . . . ,Un and V1, . . . , Vn. Sup-
pose that the two sequences have the autocorre-
lation functions A(i, j) = cov(Ui,Uj) and B(i, j) =
cov(Vi, Vj), where we assume var(Ui) = var(Vi) = 1
(although, in the standard engineering usage, auto-
correlation refers to what some would like to call
autocovariance). We do not assume that the series
are stationary, and we do not know their autocorre-
lation functions. The picture we have in mind is that
each (Ui, Vi) is a characteristic of points in a large
graph, and neighboring nodes are highly correlated,
but we do not know the neighborhood structure of
the graph. Define
R= 〈U,V 〉0 ≡ n−1
n∑
i=1
UiVi − n−2
n∑
i=1
Ui
n∑
i=1
Vi,
where 〈·, ·〉0 is the empirical cross-covariance be-
tween two sequences. Then ER= 0, while direct cal-
culations give
var(R) = n−1
n∑
i=1
〈A(i, ·),B(i, ·)〉0
−
〈
n−1
n∑
j=1
A(·, j), n−1
n∑
j=1
B(·, j)
〉
0
.
To get some sense of the size of var(R), suppose
that n−1
∑n
j=1A(i, j) ≡ n−1
∑n
j=1B(i, j) ≡ c. Then
we get
var(R) = n−2
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
(A(i, j)− c)(B(i, j)− c).
Clearly, if the two series are mixing and
∑
j A(i, j) =∑
jB(i, j) =O(1), then var(R) =O(n
−1). However,
if they are not mixing, and have similar autocorre-
lation functions, then most realizations of these two
series will have nonzero cross-correlation.
APPENDIX B: PROOFS
Proof of Proposition 4.1. Clearly,
E
∞∑
i=1
(β̂i − βi)2 = ⌊n1/2α⌋/n+
∑
i>n1/2α
β2i
≤ n−(2α−1)/2α +
∑
i>n1/2α
i−2α
≤ 2αn−(2α−1)/2α/(2α− 1).
That this is the minimax rate is established by con-
sidering the prior Π which makes β1, β2, . . . indepen-
dent, with Π(βi =±i−α) = 1/2. 
Proof of Lemma 4.2. First note that because
of the monotone likelihood ratio property, θ̂(x) is a
monotone increasing function of x. We have
1 + b˙θ = ∂EθEπ(Θ|X)/∂θ
=
∂
∂θ
Eθ
∫
te−(X−t)
2/2σ2 dπ(t)∫
e−(X−t)
2/2σ2 dπ(t)
,
where Eθ is the expectation assuming the true value
of the parameter is θ, (Θ,X) is a pair of random
variables such that Θ∼ π, and X|Θ∼N(Θ, σ2) and
Eπ is the expectation under this joint distribution.
Note that Eπ is a formal expression since we assume
that X ∼N(θ,σ2). Let Z ∼N(0, σ2) then
1 + b˙θ
=
∂
∂θ
Eθ
∫
te−(Z+θ−t)
2/2σ2 dπ(t)∫
e−(Z+θ−t)2/2σ2 dπ(t)
=
1
σ2
E
{∫
t(t−Z − θ)e−(Z+θ−t)2/2σ2 dπ(t)∫
e−(Z+θ−t)2/2σ2 dπ(t)
−
∫
te−(Z+θ−t)
2/2σ2 dπ(t)∫
e−(Z+θ−t)2/2σ2 dπ(t)
·
∫
(t−Z − θ)e−(Z+θ−t)2/2σ2 dπ(t)∫
e−(Z+θ−t)2/2σ2 dπ(t)
}
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=
1
σ2
Eθ{var(Θ|X)}.
Hence, 0 ≤ 1 + b˙θ ≤ (a/σ)2, or b˙θ ∈ [−1,−(1 −
(a/σ)2)]. The lemma then follows from the mean
value theorem. 
Proof of Theorem 5.2. Let β ∼ π. For any
i, let Fi be the distribution of bi = E(β
2
i |X−i).
Note that bi and βi are independent given β−i.
By assumption, conditionally on β−i, Pπi×Fi(|β2i −
bi| > i2α/4) > η. But then it follows from (7) that
for n large enough, Pπ(|β2i − β̂2i | > i2α/4) > η/2.
Let c′i(β) = 1{Eβ(β̂2i − β2i ) < −i2α/4}, c′′i (β) =
1{Eβ(β̂2i − β2i )> i2α/4}, and
ci(β) =

c′i(β),
m∑
i=n1/2α+ν
c′i(β)> η/3(m− n1/2α+ν),
c′′i (β), otherwise.
Now,
∑
ci(β)β̂
2
i picks exactly those β
2
i which are
estimated with bias, positive bias if ci = c
′′
i and neg-
ative if ci = c
′
i. 
Proof of Theorem 7.1. The proof is based
on the two lemmas which follow. Suppose the pos-
terior is not dn consistent on B′ with π(B′) > 0.
Then, by Lemma B.1, (8) must hold for β0 ∈ B′.
By Lemma B.2, (10) must hold. But (10) con-
tradicts π(B) = 1, since then, for all M , we have
π{β : Pβ(dn(β˜n, β)≥M)}> 0. 
Recall that β0 is the true parameter. It has a prior
probability π. βn is a random variable which, given
the dataXn, has the posterior distribution πXn . The
first lemma says that if there is a dn consistent es-
timator, but dn(βn, β0) is not tight, then neither is
dn(βn, β˜n).
Lemma B.1. Suppose that:
1. There is a statistic β˜n such that lim supnPβ0(dn(β˜n,
β0)≥M)→ 0 as M →∞.
2. For all M < ∞, lim supnPβ0(πXn(dn(βn, β0) ≥
2M)≥ 2ε)≥ 2d.
Then there is an M which may depend on β0 such
that
lim sup
n→∞
Pβ0(πXn(dn(βn, β˜n)≥M)≥ ε)≥ d.(8)
Proof.
Pβ0(πXn(dn(βn, β˜n)≥M)≥ ε)
≥ Pβ0({πXn(dn(βn, β0)≥ 2M)≥ 2ε}
∩ {dn(β˜n, β0)≤M})
≥ Pβ0(πXn(dn(βn, β0)≥ 2M)≥ 2ε)
−Pβ0(dn(β˜n, β0)≥M).
By assumption, the lim sup of the first term on the
right-hand side is bounded by 2d, while we can
choose M large enough such that the second term
on the right-hand side is bounded by d for all n large
enough. The lemma follows. 
The reverse is given in the following lemma.
Lemma B.2. Suppose there is a statistic β˜n and
M,ε, d > 0 such that
Pβ0(πXn(dn(β˜n, βn)≥M)≥ ε)≥ d(9)
for all β0 ∈ B′ and π(B′)≥ γ > 0. Then for all M <
∞,
P (dn(β˜n, β0)≥M)≥ εdγ.(10)
Proof. If U,V,W are three random variables,
then E(E(E(U |V )|W )) =E(U). Computing the ex-
pected value of (9), we obtain (10). 
Proof of Theorem 7.2. Let P,P ′ ∈ P(n).
Then
|Rn(P, δ)−Rn(P ′, δ)|
=
∣∣∣∣∫ ℓ(p, δ(x))p(x)dν(x)
−
∫
ℓ(p′, δ(x))p′(x)dν(x)
∣∣∣∣
≤
∫
|ℓ(p, δ(x))− ℓ(p′, δ(x))|p(x)dν(x)
+
∫
ℓ(p′, δ(x))|p(x)− p′(x)|dν(x).
The first term on the right-hand side is bounded by
cn‖P −P ′‖, and the second by Ln‖P −P ′‖, so that
|Rn(P, δ)−Rn(P ′, δ)| ≤ (cn +Ln)‖P −P ′‖,(11)
for all δ, P , and P ′.
By the complete class theorem, for any ε′ > 0 there
is a µn supported on P(n)K such that
max
P∈P
(n)
K
Rn(P, δµn)≤ inf
δ
max
P∈P
(n)
K
Rn(P, δ) + ε
′.(12)
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By (11), we also have∣∣∣ max
P∈P
(n)
K
Rn(P, δ)− max
P∈P(n)
Rn(P, δ)
∣∣∣
(13)
≤ (cn +Ln)ε.
Combining (12) and (13), applied to δ and δµn ,
max
P∈P(n)
Rn(P, δµm)
≤ inf
δ
max
P∈P(n)
Rn(P, δ) + (cn +Ln)ε+ ε
′.
Since ε, ε′ > 0 are arbitrary, the assertion follows.

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